Belarus. Konstantin Mashovets.

Belarus. Konstantin Mashovets.

I had been waiting for this overview for a long time; Mashovets always provides the most comprehensive and accurate information, proven over the years. He described the situation in four posts - you can read it in full on his channel. What follows here is a summary.

The overview is divided into three parts:

1) the current situation;

2) what could affect Belarus entering the war;

3) what this could change.

The first part is fairly short and unambiguous. The second and third are longer and more nuanced.

1️⃣The current situation.

▪️The scale and focus of the measures on the Belarusian-Ukrainian border and in the areas adjacent to it at the moment CANNOT unambiguously indicate the inevitability of a direct military clash between the countries, quite the opposite.

▪️The Belarusian military command is conducting only a comprehensive operation to cover the border areas. The total number of personnel in this grouping under normal conditions is 2,500-3,000 people, at maximum 4,500-4,700 people.

▪️The deployment of any offensive grouping of Belarusian troops near the border with Ukraine in any operational direction is currently NOT being observed.

2️⃣What could affect Belarus entering the war?

▪️Belarus's allied relationship with the Russian Federation. In military terms, this is implemented through the deployment of a regional grouping of forces of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus (RGF) in accordance with the "Union State" treaty. The total size of the RGF is 9,000-10,000 service members of BOTH countries.

▪️The command-and-control issues of this grouping, and the plans for its deployment and use, have ALREADY been planned and practiced. The RGF can be used to cover the deployment of the Russian Armed Forces in Belarus for a subsequent offensive.

But:

▪️The theoretical possibility of deploying the Russian Armed Forces on the territory of Belarus DOES NOT mean the ability to carry this out in practice. Without a new stage of mobilization in Russia, all talk of a breakthrough toward Kyiv, Chernihiv, or the seizure of the Rivne Nuclear Power Plant is wishful thinking fit only for informational and psychological intimidation.

▪️If Belarus enters the war with its own forces and without Russia, its command can count only on achieving certain tactical goals in one or two directions - something like seizing a small bridgehead, as the Russian Armed Forces did in Sumy Oblast.

3️⃣What could Belarus entering the war change?

▪️Given the current difficulties of the Russian offensive, Belarus entering the war would objectively become an unscheduled "New Year's gift" for Russia, as it would force Ukraine to reconsider the use of its operational-strategic-level reserves.

But:

▪️Without the Russian Armed Forces, the Belarusian army is unlikely to be capable of achieving anything more than drawing off Ukrainian reserves. Moreover, it is quite likely that a blocking grouping of the Ukrainian Armed Forces is ALREADY in the process of operational deployment, and in a composition optimized in advance.

▪️If Belarus enters the war, Russia will have to provide it with additional financial and material support, especially considering that over four years of war the Russian Armed Forces have ALREADY stripped out of Belarus most of its weapons, equipment, and ammunition.

▪️Right now the Russian Armed Forces are struggling, with problems and disruptions, to sustain their own grouping in the southwestern theater of military operations. Carrying one more "extra burden" in the form of the Belarusian Armed Forces will be very difficult, especially given the limited realistically achievable goals in the northern theater.

Conclusions:

▪️Right now there are no signs of an offensive grouping being formed in the north.

▪️All formal prerequisites for Belarus entering the war have already been created.

▪️Nevertheless, without large-scale mobilization in BOTH countries, the real involvement of Belarus looks doubtful.

▪️Belarus entering the war on its own lacks strategic sense; it can seize only a couple of villages.

The point of the Kremlin pushing Belarus toward entering the war is probably as follows:

▪️To alter the plans of Ukraine's strategic defense, since this would lead to the regrouping of significant forces and assets.

▪️To put psychological pressure on residents of Ukraine's northern regions in order to force the military-political leadership to immediately stop the war on any terms.

In general, for Russia and Belarus to do anything large-scale, they will need mobilization in any case.